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Abstract
This paper studies some benefits of ignoring those who disagree with you. We model a de-
cision maker who draws a signal about the (real-valued) state of the world from a collection of
unbiased sources of heterogeneous quality. Exclusively sampling signals close to the prior expec-
tation can be beneficial, as they are more likely high quality. Since echo chambers are a rational
response to uncertain information quality, eliminating them can backfire. Signals close to the
prior expectation can move beliefs further than more contrary views; limiting the ability to ig-
nore opposing views can make beliefs less accurate and reduce the extent to which signals are
heeded.
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1 Introduction
People like to ignore those they disagree with. This has been documented empirically in a variety
of contexts. Cookson, Engelberg, and Mullins (2020) find that users of a social media site for stock
investors tend to follow others whose sentiment (bullish/bearish) matches their own. Bakshy,
Messing, and Adamic (2015) find that Facebook users tend to have friends who share their political
views, and thus end up seeing news they agree with more often. Garimella, De Francisci Morales,
Gionis, and Mathioudakis (2018) find similar selective exposure on Twitter. Stroud (2017) reviews
the communications literature on selective exposure.
Echo chambers are sometimes assumed to be a form of psychological bias, and have been
framed as a threat to democracy (Sunstein, 2018). However, we study some benefits for rational
people who just want the best information. When information sources are unbiased but some are
low quality, those that agree with you are more likely to be of higher quality. In this context, echo
chambers may be a reasonable way of filtering out low quality information, rather than a mistake
to be corrected. The distinction is important because if the underlying issue of information quality
is not addressed, policies that target people’s ability to filter information based on content can have
unintended consequences.
In our model, an agent starts with a prior belief about the state of the world, which is real-
valued. There exists a collection of signal sources. While none is biased, some sources have lower
signal variance than others. The agent draws a signal without knowing the quality of the source.
She is endowed with a technology that allows her to sample by signal content, making it more
likely that she will draw signals with some values than with others. Finally, she takes an action and
is rewarded more the closer it is to the true state.
In what context might sampling by content be possible? One example of such a restriction of
attention might be ignoring the opinion page of a newspaper known to represent the other side
of the political spectrum.1 Choosing which article to read based on headlines that hint at their
content without revealing the main takeaway precisely (e.g “clickbait”) could also qualify. Another
example could be joining a group on social media with a known range of views.
Our main results are as follows. First, if there exist information sources of low enough quality
(high enough variance), then it is optimal to ignore (not sample) signals that differ by too much
1In a more general example, the agent randomly allocates attention to different news sources, with more attention paid
on average to some sources than others. In this vein, Section 4 studies normal sampling weights.
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from one’s prior expectation (Theorem 1). In other words, the optimal echo chamber can be finite.
This is true even if there are very few low-quality sources. Selective sampling trades off accuracy
in extreme states, which are less likely, for accuracy in states that are close to the prior expectation.
Second, we find that posterior beliefs are non-monatonic in the signal received—signals close to
the prior expectation can in some cases move beliefs further than more contrary views, since the
former are more credible (Proposition 1). Third, removing the agent’s ability to ignore signals she
disagrees with not only makes her beliefs less accurate in expectation, but also causes her to weight
her own prior beliefs more (pay less heed to the signal she receives—Proposition 2).
Echo chambers do have drawbacks. If two people disagree on a factual matter, one must be
wrong. And if they refuse to listen to each other, the disagreement may persist. One naı¨ve so-
lution is to expose people to more information that challenges their beliefs—for example, giving
people less control over what appears in their social media feeds.2 However, our results show that
constraining the ability to select sources based on their content can actually undermine trust and
reduce the extent to which people are persuaded by signals from others. As such, interventions that
help people distinguish reliable sources in other ways may be the only way to improve inference.
Our results contribute to a long theoretical literature on polarization and divergence of beliefs,
some of which (like ours) models echo chambers as the product of rational selection. Calvert (1985)
shows that a source of information with a known bias towards a decision maker’s prior may be
preferable to an unbiased source. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006) build on this principle and show
that if rational news consumers prize accuracy in reporting, news producers will generate biased
stories in an attempt to seem accurate by matching consumers’ priors. Suen (2004) shows that using
such biased sources over time, while rational, can lead to polarization in beliefs. The main distin-
guishing feature of our model relative to this literature is the continuous state space (rather than
binary), which gives a natural way to think about similarity between different states3 and facilitates
our main results on the range of views worthy of attention (Theorem 1), how echo chambers can
expand the degree to which somebody can be persuaded away from their prior beliefs (Proposi-
tion 2), and non-monotonicity in response to signals (Proposition 1). Our results do not depend on
discontinuities created by binary signals, or the boundedness of their support. Our setup does not
2For example, while some suggestion algorithms show users news stories similar to those they already like, others such
as the BuzzFeed News feature “Outside Your Bubble” (Smith, 2017) are designed to show users a range of perspectives.
3For example, if the state of the world represents the optimal minimum wage policy, it is intuitive to think that $16 is
more similar to $15 than $6.
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rely on biased signals, as do the aforementioned papers; rather, our agent achieves a similar result
by sampling unbiased signals close to her prior expectation.
Other papers that use a binary state space (or multiple binary issues) include Nimark and Sun-
daresan (2019), in which “agents know how precise their information is, and yet, they still choose
channels that are more likely to confirm their prior beliefs,” in contrast to our paper and Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2006), where source quality is unknown and thus entangled with the priors of the
information consumer. Benoıˆt and Dubra (2019) show that rational players can update their be-
liefs about a certain issue in opposite directions in response to the same signal if that signal is
“equivocal”—if its likelihood depends on some other ancillary issue, about which the players may
have different beliefs. Contemporaneous work by Williams (2019) generates results similar to ours
by assuming heterogeneity in preferences or the correlation of information; by contrast, the driving
mechanism behind the confirmation bias in our paper is heterogeneity in signal quality (though
others’ signals are independent from that of the agent). Sethi and Yildiz (2012) have similar re-
sults regarding correlated signals. Sethi and Yildiz (2016) develop a model similar to ours with
heterogeneous signal quality, but in their model the agent knows the signal quality (“expertise”)
of the sources she can sample from. In our paper, not knowing whether others are well- or ill-
informed is precisely what causes the agent to trust those with signals closer to her own. Mailath
and Samuelson (2020) model persistent disagreement as arising from the use of different models.
Acemoglu, Chernozhukov, and Yildiz (2016) show that a small amount of uncertainty about signal
distributions can lead to asymptotic disagreement as individual observe infinitely many signals.
Our model features unbiased sources of information and a rational agent who simply wants to
know the state of the world. By contrast, another strand of related literature departs from fully
rational Bayesian updating of beliefs. Rabin and Schrag (1999) study a decision maker who occa-
sionally misinterprets unbiased signals, but only when they disagree with the prior belief. Loh and
Phelan (2019) show that if boundedly rational agents update marginal beliefs (but not a joint distri-
bution across all states), beliefs can diverge asymptotically in response to common information. By
contrast, our agent’s rationality is unbounded. Golman, Hagmann, and Loewenstein (2017) review
the literature on avoiding free information (by contrast, in our model information has an oppor-
tunity cost). Stone (2019) develops a model of affective polarization, in which players’ distrust of
each others’ selflessness grows, whereas in our model there is no misalignment of incentives. De-
Marzo, Vayanos, and Zwiebel (2003) suppose that people suffer from “persuasion bias”—a failure
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to account for the repetition of information.
Experimental findings support the idea that selective exposure to similar views is motivated by
seeking credible information sources under time or attention constraints. Fischer, Jonas, Frey, and
Schulz-Hardt (2005) find that limiting the number of information sources participants can review
increases their tendency to select information that supports their prior views. Metzger, Hartsell,
and Flanagin (2020) find that news articles that support participants’ prior attitudes are viewed as
more credible. Some work does demonstrate confirmation bias to a degree that exceeds rational
behavior. For example, Hill (2017) finds that subjects learning about political facts do update be-
liefs, but more slowly than Bayes’ rule would suggest (in their experiment signal quality is known,
unlike our setup). Relative to such findings, fully rational models such as ours may be thought of
as a relevant baseline on top of which psychological biases may play a role. Further, our model
may explain why such biases arose—as a heuristic approximating a rational distrust of sources
with opposing views.
Finally, our paper can also be related to the literature on network formation. Social networks of-
ten exhibit homophily (the tendency of connected individuals to share traits) in many dimensions,
including political affiliation: friends tend to agree on politics. Clark and Tenev (2019) demonstrate
this empirically and show that stronger friendships may form between politically aligned people
as a social reward to motivate costly voting. Here we provide a complementary explanation for
political homophily beyond heterogeneity in preferences: people befriend those whose opinions
they trust.
Section 2 describes the baseline model, and Section 3 derives the main results. Section 4 extends
the baseline model to allow for sampling according to a normal distribution over signals, rather
than uniform sampling within a certain radius. Section 5 concludes with some discussion of policy
implications, and ideas for future work. Throughout, long proofs are relegated to Appendix A2.
2 Model
Consider an agent choosing an action a P R. The state of the world ω P R is unknown, and the
agent has a prior belief µ0pωq which has full support, is single-peaked (quasiconcave), symmetric,
and has finite mean and variance. Let ω0 and σ20 denote the prior mean and variance. The agent’s
utility function is upa|ωq “ ´pa´ ωq2, penalizing her for actions that differ from the true state.
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There exists a continuum of signal sources. A fraction h are high quality and produce signals
distributed fHps|ωq and the remaining fraction 1 ´ h produce signals distributed fLps|ωq. Both
signal distributions have full support in R, are single-peaked (quasiconcave), and are symmetric
about the true state of the world (that is, the mean of each is ω). However, fLps|ωq is a mean
preserving spread of fHps|ωq, capturing the notion that low-type sources provide lower-quality
signals. We will denote the variances of the high- and low-type signal distributions σH and σL, and
assume that they are finite. Define f ps|ωq ” hfH ps|ωq ` p1´ hq fL ps|ωq to be the total probability
density of signal s given state ω.
Before choosing an action, the agent can sample one signal. Its source cannot be credibly con-
veyed to the agent, but the agent can choose to sample only signals within a radius r P R¯` of the
prior mean ω0. Given a chosen range, let Tr denote the truncation operation. Then the distribution
of the signal sampled is Trfps|ωq, that is:
Trfps|ωq “
$’&’%
fps|ωq
F pω0`r|ωq´F pω0´r|ωq ; s P pω0 ´ r, ω0 ` rq
0 ; otherwise
where F pr|ωq “ şr´8 fps|ωqds is the cumulative distribution function of fp¨q.
The timing is as follows.
1. The state of the world ω is drawn from the agent’s prior belief distribution µ0, which has
mean ω0 and variance σ20 .
2. The agent chooses a radius, r P R¯`, to sample within.
3. The agent observes a signal s, drawn from the distribution Trf ps|ωq.
4. The agent takes an action a P R, and receives a payoff upa|ωq “ ´pa´ ωq2.
The agent can sample the whole space of signals by choosing r “ 8 (in this case, let T8 simply
be the identity operator). We call this strategy the un-censored signal, since the agent updates her
beliefs based on the un-truncated realization of fps|ωq. However, while increasing the censoring
radius r is beneficial whenever the state of the world is far from the prior mean ω0, signals far from
ω0 are more likely to come from low-quality sources (see Corollary 2). Therefore, restricting the
sampling radius may maximize the informativeness of the signal. Crucially, the way to think about
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censoring in this model is not that the agent receives and discards signals outside radius r. Rather,
by censoring the agent guarantees that the signal drawn will not be outside the censoring radius.
One interpretation of this setup is as follows. There exist many news sources, each of which is
known to only publish information that falls within a certain range of the political spectrum. The
agent chooses which to get her news from, and disregards the information offered by other sources.
Such behavior can be considered “selective exposure,” and the limited range of signals the agent is
willing to consider an “information silo” or “echo chamber.” In our model these phenomena arise
as a rational response to limited sampling capacity and uncertainty about the quality of signals.
3 Results
3.1 Main results
The agent’s posterior belief on the state of the world after receiving signal s is:
µ1 pω|s, rq “ Trfps|ωqµ0pωqş
Trfps|ω1qµ0pω1qdω1 . (1)
Since the agent maximizes the expected value of upa|ωq “ ´pa´ ωq2, the optimal action, given
a sampling strategy, equals the posterior expected state. Another way of thinking about it is that
since utility is quadratic loss, maximizing utility is equivalent to minimizing the expected variance
of the posterior. Given a signal and the sampling strategy, the optimal action is:
a‹ps, rq “
ż
ωµ1 pω|s, rqdω. (2)
Thus, the problem of choosing r reduces to the following integral
min
rPR¯`
ż ˆż
pω ´ a‹ps, rqq2 Trfps|ωqds
˙
µ0pωqdω (3)
To study the choice of censoring policy, r, we define the actions that the agent would choose if
there was no uncertainty about source quality. Let
a‹qps, rq “
ż
ωµ1pω|s, r, qqdω (4)
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for q P tH,Lu, where
µ1pω|s, r, qq “ Trfqps|ωqµ0pωqş
Trfqps|ω1qµ0pω1qdω1 .
Naturally, when there is only one type of source, higher signals imply a higher expected state.
Lemma 1. Given a censoring radius r P p0,8s and source type q P tH,Lu, a‹q ps, rq is strictly increasing
in s.
Proof. Let 0 ă s ă s1, fix r P p0,8s, and without loss of generality let q “ H . If ω ą s1, then
fH
`
s1|r˘ ą fH ps|rq , (5)
so ω is more likely given s1:
µ1
`
ω|s1, r,H˘ ą µ1 pω|s, r,Hq . (6)
For states below s, the reverse is true. So higher states are more likely under s1, and lower states
are more likely under s. As s1 gets closer to s,
şs1
s
ωµ1 pω|s, r,Hq dω can be made arbitrarily small.
So from Equation 4, we have that a‹H ps, rq ă a‹H ps1, rq.
Lemma 2. Given any censoring range, r, the optimal action is the convex combination of the expected
posteriors without quality uncertainty, a‹Hps, rq and a‹Lps, rq:
a‹ps, rq “ P pH|s, rqa‹Hps, rq ` P pL|s, rqa‹Lps, rq
where P pH|s, rq is the posterior probability of the signal being of high quality given the signal received and
the censoring policy, and P pL|s, rq “ 1´ P pH|s, rq is the chance of a low-quality source.
Proof.
a‹ps, rq “
ż
ωµ1pω|s, rqdω
“
ż
ω rµ1pω|s, r,HqP pH|s, rq ` µ1pω|s, r, LqP pL|s, rqs dω
“ P pH|s, rq
„ż
ωµ1pω|s, r,Hqdω

` P pL|s, rq
„ż
ωµ1pω|s, r, Lqdω

“ P pH|s, rqa‹Hps, rq ` P pL|s, rqa‹Lps, rq
The second line follows from the law of total probability, the third one from linearity of integrals,
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and the fourth one re-labels the variables.
Lemma 2 showcases that the censoring policy could affect the objective function in Equation 3
in three ways:
1. Directly through the probability of receiving a signal, Trfps|ωq;
2. Through the optimal actions without uncertainty, a‹Hps, rq and a‹Lps, rq;
3. Through the posterior probability of the signal source being high-type, P pH|s, rq.
However, the following lemma establishes that P pH|s, rq is constant in r.
Lemma 3. Given a signal s, the posterior probability of the signal coming from a high-type source is invari-
ant to the censoring radius: P pH|s, r1q “ P pH|s, rq @ 0 ă r ď r1 such that s P p´r, rq. Thus, we denote
such probability by P pH|sq.
Proof. Let us denote density functions by p and probability functions by P. Then, Bayes’ rule gives
us
P pH|s, rq “ p ps|H, rqP pH|rq
p ps|rq
“
pps|Hq
PpsPp´r,rq|Hq
PpsPp´r,rq|HqPpHq
PpsPp´r,rqq
ppsq
PpsPp´r,rqq
“ P pHq p ps|Hq
p psq
“ h
ş
fHps|ωqµ0pωqdωş
fps|ωqµ0pωqdω ” P pH|sq
Lemma 3 establishes that given a signal s, the agent’s belief in its source’s quality does not
depend on how big or small the chosen censoring range is.
Intuitively, the further the signal is from the prior expectation, the lower the perceived prob-
ability of it being of high quality. Indeed, if the prior and signal distributions are all normally
distributed, this is the case:
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Corollary 1. If fHps|ωq, fLps|ωq and µ0pωq are normal, the odds ratio takes the following form:
PpH|sq
PpL|sq “
ˆ
h
1´ h
˙d
σ2L ` σ20
σ2H ` σ20
¨ exp
"
´ ps´ ω0q
2pσ2L ´ σ2Hq
2pσ2H ` σ20qpσ2L ` σ20q
*
;
and so PpH|sq is decreasing in |s´ ω0|.
Proof. Available in Appendix A2.
Note that to obtain the previous result we need a stronger condition than the monotone like-
lihood ratio property for each state, ω. Instead, we need monotonicity of the average likelihood
ratio. We call this regularity property the decreasing average likelihood ratio property:
Definition 1. We say that fHps|ωq, fLps|ωq and µ0pωq satisfy the decreasing average likelihood ratio
property with respect to |s´ ω0| if:
Lpsq :“
ş
fHps|ωqµ0pωqdωş
fLps|ωqµ0pωqdω
is decreasing in |s´ ω0|. We call this information environment regular.
When the prior and signal distributions satisfy this regularity condition, the following corollary
is immediate:
Corollary 2. PpH|sq is decreasing in |s´ ω0| if the information environment is regular.
Corollary 2 states the regularity conditions to ensure that, the more the signal received disagrees
with the agent’s prior, the less likely it is perceived to be high-quality information.
Lemma 4. Assume fL, fH , and µ0 are distributed normally. If |σ2H ´ σ2L| Ñ 0 or hÑ s P t0, 1u, then the
optimal radius is r‹ Ñ8 and a‹ps, rq converges uniformly to an increasing and linear function of s.
Proof. Lemma 9 (in Appendix A1) shows that if there is no uncertainty about the quality of infor-
mation, the signal received is normal, so the posterior expected state is a linear convex combination
of the prior and the signal. The expected utility is strictly monotonic and achieves its maximum at
r “ 8. The continuity of the expected utility, with respect to σ2H , σ2L, and h completes the proof.
Lemma 4 establishes that with normal signals, uncertainty about the quality of the signal is
a necessary condition for censoring to be optimal. The following proposition establishes some
consequences of having non-trivial uncertainty.
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Since signals further from the agent’s prior expectation are less trustworthy, they can also be
less persuasive. In fact, it may be the case that there are regions of the signal space in which the
agent’s posterior belief is decreasing in the signal received—a more extreme signal results in a less
extreme action. To show this can happen, we will use Equation 7, which Lemma 5 shows will hold
for normal distributions.
Lemma 5. Assume fL, fH , and µ0 are distributed normally, and that σH ă σL. Then
lim
sÑ8P pH|s,8q a
‹
H psq “ 0 (7)
Proof. Since both the prior belief µ0 and the signal distribution are normal, the optimal action a‹H psq
is a linear function of s. By Corollary 1 (and for clarity, suppressing irrelevant constants),
P pH|sq
P pL|sq „ e
´s2 . (8)
Since P pL|sq “ 1´ P pH|sq, a little algebra yields
P pH|sq „ e
´s2
1` e´s2 “
1
1` es2 . (9)
Then
P pH|sq a‹H ps,8q „ s1` es2 . (10)
Since es
2
grows much faster than s, the result follows.
Equation 7 says that the contribution of high types to the optimal action (which is given by
Lemma 2) vanishes for high enough signals (by symmetry, the same is true for low enough signals).
We will also use the following regularity condition: for each type, q P tL,Hu, and any state ω,
σq Ñ8ñ fq ps|ωq pÝÑ 0. (11)
Note that Equation 11 holds for the normal distribution.
Proposition 1. Assume the information environment is regular, and that Equations 7 and 11 hold. Fix σ0,
σH , and h P p0, 1q. Then there exists σL such that the optimal uncensored action a‹ps,8q is not monotonic
10
in s and has a local maximum.
Proof. Pick s ą 0 such that a‹ psq ą 0. Such an s must exist, since by Lemma 1 both aH psq and
aL psq are strictly increasing in s, and Lemma 4 tells us that a‹ is a weighted average of the two.
Pick s1 ą s such that
P
`
H|s1˘ aH `s1˘ ă a‹ psq
2
. (12)
Equation 7 guarantees that such an s1 exists.
Pick σL such that
aL
`
s1
˘ ă a‹ psq
2
. (13)
Such a σL must exist, by Equation 11. By Lemma 4,
a‹
`
s1
˘ “ P `H|s1˘ aH `s1˘` `1´ P `H|s1˘˘ aL `s1˘ . (14)
Combining this with Equations 12 and 13 yields the result,
a‹
`
s1
˘ ă a‹ psq
2
` a
‹ psq
2
“ a‹ psq . (15)
The previous result establishes that if there is non-trivial uncertainty about the quality of the
signal (h away from 0 and 1) and the low quality signal is sufficiently less informative than the
high quality signal, the agent does not always respond to signals further from her prior by taking
larger actions. A signal far from her prior is interpreted to be significantly more likely to come
from a low type so the optimal action is smaller in absolute value than f the signal was closer to
the prior, thus deemed likely to be high quality. When the range of values for which a‹ps, r “ 8q is
decreasing is large enough, it is optimal for the agent to restrict her sampling to a finite radius.
To show this, we first derive the unsurprising result that expected utility is higher when all
sources are high-type.
Lemma 6. The expected utility of playing a‹H with high type sources only (and no censoring) is strictly
greater than that of playing a‹ with both high and low types.
Proof. fps|ωq is a mean-preserving spread of fHps|ωq since they have the same expected value ω,
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but hσ2H ` p1 ´ hqσ2L ą σ2H . From Blackwell (1951), it follows that the value of making a decision
after receiving a signal realization from f is lower than making a decision after receiving a signal
realization from fH .
We now proceed to the main results of the paper. Theorem 1 and Proposition 2 demonstrate that
echo chambers can aid inference, and extend the extent to which people can be persuaded. First,
we show that if low-type signals are noisy enough, it is optimal for the agent to censor to a finite
radius r.
Theorem 1. Fix variances σ20 and σ2H , and h P p0, 1q. If Equation 11 holds, there exists ‹ ą σ2H such that
σ2L ě ‹ implies that r‹ ă 8.
The essence of the proof (provided in Appendix A2) is that if low types have a high enough
signal variance, you can set a censoring radius r such that almost all signals from high types are
within r and almost all signals from low types are outside r. Censoring thus approximates the ex-
pected utility of only receiving signals from high types, which by Lemma 6 is preferable to receiving
signals from both types.
Lemma 7. Fix a symmetric, quasiconcave prior state distribution µ0 pωq and a symmetric, quasiconcave sig-
nal distribution f ps|ωq. Then the posterior expectation after observing s is greater than the prior expectation
ω0 iff s ą ω0 (“updating in the direction of the signal”— Chambers and Healy, 2012).
Proof. Without loss of generality, let µ0 have mean zero and fix s ą 0.
Because µ0 has mean zero,
ż 0
´8
µ0 pωqωdω `
ż 8
0
µ0 pωqωdω “ 0. (16)
Since f is quasiconcave and symmetric about s, we know that f ps| ´ ωq ă f ps|ωq for ω ą 0,
because |ω ` s| ą |ω ´ s|. Then
ż 0
´8
ωµ0 pωq f ps|ωq dω `
ż 8
0
ωµ0 pωq f ps|ωq dω ą 0. (17)ş
ωµ0 pωq f ps|ωq dωş
µ0 pωq f ps|ωq dω ą 0 (18)
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Lemma 7 gives the intuitive result that receiving a signal above the prior expectation results in
a higher posterior expectation. For a thorough treatment, see Chambers and Healy (2012).
Lemma 8. Fix normal prior and signal distributions µ0 pωq and f ps|ωq, where ω0 is the mean of µ0.4 Let
µˆ0 be a mean-preserving spread of µ0 for which
µ0pωq
µˆ0pωq is decreasing in |ω´ω0|. After observing signal s, the
posterior expectation is further from the prior expectation if the prior belief was µˆ0 than if it was µ0:
|
ş
ωµ0 pωq f ps|ωq dωş
µ0 pωq f ps|ωq dω | ă |
ş
ωµˆ0 pωq f ps|ωq dωş
µˆ0 pωq f ps|ωq dω |. (19)
Lemma 8 says that the more diffuse an agent’s prior, the more weight is put on the signal re-
ceived. We show here that this is true given normal prior and signal distributions, but this is not
a necessary condition. The intuition of the proof (given in Appendix A2) is that starting with a
sharper prior µ is equivalent (in terms of posterior beliefs) to starting with a more diffuse prior and
receiving an additional signal equal to the prior expectation.
Proposition 2. Fix a prior belief distribution µ0 pωq (with mean ω0) and a signal distribution f ps|ωq.
Assume that for both fL and fH , Equation 19 holds for any mean-preserving spread µˆ0 of µ0 for which
µ0pωq
µˆ0pωq
is decreasing in |ω ´ ω0|. Then given a signal 0 ă s ă r, the optimal action is decreasing in the censoring
radius: r1 ą r ùñ a‹ ps, r1q ă a‹ ps, rq.
Proposition 2 gives conditions under which a signal will move the agent’s expectation further
if it comes an echo chamber. In this sense, echo chambers facilitate compromise. While receiving a
given signal from the echo chamber doesn’t make the agent any more confident that it comes from
a high-type source (Lemma 3), it does make the agent more confident that the signal indicates an
extreme state.
Proof. The intuition of the proof is that restricting signals to a censoring radius generates a posterior
belief (given signal s) that is equivalent to the posterior generated by starting with a higher-variance
prior belief and drawing an uncensored signal. The effect is to put more weight on the signal in the
posterior belief.
First, consider fH alone. Define µˆ pω|rq to be the belief distribution such that
µˆ pω|rq9 µ0 pωq
FH pω0 ` r|ωq ´ FH pω0 ´ r|ωq (20)
4Since f is assumed to be normal, we can think of this as signals coming from one source type only.
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That is, µˆ is the prior belief of state ω divided by the chance of a signal within r of the prior ex-
pectation, ω0 (and then multiplied by whatever constant ensures it integrates to 1). Note that µˆ is a
mean-preserving spread of µ: both have the same mean ω0, but the denominator FH pω0 ` r|ωq ´
FH pω0 ´ r|ωq is strictly decreasing in |ω ´ ω0|, putting more weight on extreme states. Note also
that µˆ is, like µ, symmetric about ω0 and decreasing as ω gets further from ω0.
Now observe that the posterior given censoring radius r, given in Equation 1, is equal to
µ1 pω|s, rq “ fH ps|ωq µˆ pωqş
fHps|ω1qµˆpω1|rqdω1 . (21)
In other words, the posterior belief given censoring radius r and signal s is the same as if the agent
had started with the more diffuse prior belief µˆ and drawn an uncensored signal.
By Lemma 8, this implies a‹Hps, rq ą a‹Hps, r1q. Following the same line of argument with fL
instead of fH , we have also that a‹Lps, rq ą a‹Lps, r1q.
By Lemma 2,
a‹ps, rq “ P pH|s, rqa‹Hps, rq ` P pL|s, rqa‹Lps, rq. (22)
By Lemma 3, the chance of a given type does not depend on the censoring radius r: P pH|s, rq “
P pH|sq and P pL|s, rq “ P pL|sq. Since both a‹Hps, rq ą a‹Hps, r1q and a‹Lps, rq ą a‹Lps, r1q, this yields
our result: a‹ps, rq ą a‹ps, r1q.
3.2 Example
To illustrate the results, consider an example. Assume the prior, high-type signals, and low-type
signals are normally distributed with variances σ20 “ 1, σ2H “ 12 , and σ2L “ 3 respectively. The prior
mean is zero (ω0 “ 0) and half of the sources are high-type (h “ 12 ). Figure 1 shows the expected
utility of censoring to radius r (solid line) as compared to the expected utility of not censoring
(dotted line), in all cases assuming the agent plays the optimal action given the signal received as
per Equation 2.
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Figure 1: Expected utility as a function of censoring radius r
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At a radius of r “ 0, the agent is only sampling signals exactly equal to the prior expectation
of 0, and not learning anything. The expected utility is thus simply equal to the negative prior
variance, since utility is quadratic loss. At a radius of r‹ « 2.25, the expected utility of censoring
is maximized, and is higher than the expected utility of not censoring. As r goes to infinity, the
expected utility with censoring approaches the expected utility with no censoring, as the radius of
attention grows to encompass more and more of the signal space.
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Figure 2: Signal variance and correlation with the state as a function of censoring radius r
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Figure 2 gives another way to see the tradeoff involved in expanding the censoring radius.
Increasing r increases the variance of the signal received, including valuable information about the
state. Beyond the optimal radius r‹, however, the correlation of the signal with the state peaks
diminishes again as a low-type source becomes more likely.
Figure 3 shows, for these parameters, the optimal action for a given signal. The dotted blue line
in the middle is the optimal action with no censoring. Per Lemma 2, this is a mixture of the optimal
action with low types only and the optimal action with high types only, given by the dotted red and
green lines respectively. The weight is determined by the chance of a high type for a given signal,
given by the grey shading (right axis). By Corollary 1, higher signals are less likely to come from
high types, so the optimal action starts off closer to the upper high-types-only ray at the origin but
approaches the lower low-types-only ray as the signal s goes to infinity.
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Figure 3: Optimal action as a function of signal
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The solid blue line in the middle shows the expected utility if the agent samples only within the
optimal radius r‹ « 2.25, and then takes the optimal action given that sampling (Equation 2). This
is again a weighted mixture of the solid red and green lines below and above, which represent the
low-types-only and high-types-only optimal actions given censoring to r‹. Note that when only
one type of source exists, censoring is not optimal (Lemma 4)—these are only shown to illustrate
the components that constitute the optimal mixture when there is uncertainty about source quality.
The optimal action with no censoring exhibits the non-monotonicity predicted by Proposition
1. A signal of s “ 2 prompts a higher action than a signal of s “ 4, because the agent knows that
the latter almost surely came from a low-type source. In other words, a moderate view can elicit a
greater response than an extreme one, because it is more trustworthy.
Figure 3 also illustrates Proposition 2. Given a proportion of high types h and a signal s, the
optimal action with censoring is of greater magnitude than the optimal action without censoring.
This can be seen from the fact that each solid line lies above the dotted line of the same color. So for
a given message, echo chambers facilitate a stronger response.
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3.3 Omniscient high types
We now consider the benchmark where the precision of high types is unbounded: σ2H Ñ 0. We
assume that the belief at the limit is be equal to the limit of beliefs along any convergent sequence.5
Let the odds of a high type be denoted by Xps “ s¯q; then:
Xpsq ” PpH|sq
PpL|sq “
ˆ
h
1´ h
˙d
σ2L ` σ20
σ20
¨ exp
„
´ps´ µ0q
2pσ2Lq
2σ20pσ2L ` σ20q

.
So the probability that the signal comes from the high type is:
PpH|sq “ Xpsq
1`Xpsq .
Given this posterior probability, the expected state is:
Epω|s, rq “ PpH|sqpsq ` p1´ PpH|sqq rEpω|s¯, L, rqs
“ PpH|sqpsq ` p1´ PpH|sqq
»–ż 8
´8
ω
fLps|ωq
FLpr|ωq´FLp´r|ωq µ0 pωqş ´ fLps|ω1q
FLpr|ω1q´FLp´r|ω1q
¯
µ0 pω1qdω1
dω
fifl (23)
“ PpH|sqpsq ` p1´ PpH|sqq a‹Lps, rq (24)
This is the convex combination of the received signal and the posterior mean conditional on low
types, weighted by the posterior beliefs on the quality of the signal source. For signals close to the
prior expectation, the agent may be quite certain that the source is a high type, and play nearly the
signal value, effecting almost no loss. This illustrates the limit of trust in this model: if you’re sure a
signal comes from a high type and the high type has no signal variance (omniscience), it is optimal
to trust the signal completely.
4 Normal Sampling
This section demonstrates that the main findings are not unique to the strategy space of the main
model, which requires the agent to either sample signals (with equal weight) or ignore them. Here
we consider an alternative strategy space for the agent, which permits a more gradual weighting
5This allows us to use the continuity of the previous closed form. Note that otherwise, P ps “ s¯|H, rqmay be conditioning
on a zero probability event if the true state is not inside the chosen range.
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of signals distant from her prior expectation. Suppose that instead of choosing a censoring radius
r, the agent chooses a sampling function γpsq which is a normal distribution with mean ω0 and
variance σ2γ (one can show that it is optimal to choose the sampling mean to be equal to the prior
mean). Throughout this section, we assume that the prior belief µ0 is normally distributed with
mean ω0 and variance σ20 , and that the high- and low-type signal distributions are mean-zero nor-
mal distributions with variances σ2H and σ
2
L. Lemma 2 follows with the appropriate modification.
That is a‹qps, σ2γq “ αγqω0`p1´αγqqs for all q P tH,Lu is a convex combination of the prior and the
signal received, where the weight on the prior is
αγq “ σ
´2
0
σ´20 ` σ´2γ ` σ´2q
; a function of σ2γ , @ q P tH,Lu
Lemma 1 and Corollary 3 also hold with normal sampling (so long as the sampling rule, γpsq
does not depend on the state, ω, or the quality of the signal, q. If we let α¯γ “ P pH|sqαγH `
P pL|sqαγL the optimization problem becomes
min
σ2γ
ż
Ω
„ż
S
pω ´ pα¯γω0 ` p1´ α¯γqsqq2 gps|ω, σ2γqds

µ0pωqdω
where
gps|ω, σ2γq “ γpsqfps|ωqş
S
γps1qfps1|ωqds1
is the distribution of signals given the choice of γpsq, in particular of σ2γ . The above integral admits
a closed form which is best represented by defining the quality-specific weights:
λγq “ σ
´2
q
σ´2q ` σ´2γ @ q P tH,Lu
and their average λ¯γ “ hλγH ` p1´ hqλγL. With this notation at hand, the problem simplifies to:
min
σ2γ
`
1´ p1´ α¯γqλ¯γ
˘2
σ20 ` hp1´ hqp1´ α¯γq2 pλγH ´ λγLq2 σ20 ` p1´ α¯γq2phσ2γH ` p1´ hqγ2γLq
where σ2γq are the variances of the sampling policy conditional on type q:
σγq “ 1
σ´2γ ` σ´2q @ q P tH,Lu
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In Appendix A1, we show how this equation looks when h P t0, 1u (that is, all low types or
all high types). All the average variables are equal to the type-specific variables, and the second
term vanishes. With a single type, we show that at σ2γ “ 0 the objective function is equal to σ20 , and
at σ2γ “ 8, the objective takes the value of
´
σ2q
σ2q`σ20
¯
σ20 ă σ20 with a (possible) local maximum at
σ2γ “ σ
2
q´σ20
σ2q`σ20 . In such a case, the objective is minimized at σ
2
γ “ 8 (Lemma 10).
When the quality of information is uncertain, h P p0, 1q, the convex combination of these two
loss functions admits a finite minimizer when the difference in qualities is large enough. In the
limit, when σ2H Ñ 0 and σ2L Ñ 8, we have that P pH|sq Ñ 1 for all s P S and the agent’s problem
becomes
min
σ2γ
p1´ hqpσ20 ` σ2γq,
which is minimized at σ2γ “ 0.
It is not possible to rank normal vs. uniform sampling (as in the main model) in terms of
agent welfare, even for a normally distributed prior and signals—there exist cases where each is
preferable. However, this section demonstrates that the main takeaways of the main model are
not an artifact of the particular sampling strategy. The existence of noisy enough low-type sources
makes weighting signals closer to one’s prior expectation preferable.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies the conditions under which echo chambers are rational. When some people
are better informed than others, those who disagree with you are less likely to be among the well-
informed (Corollary 2). So if time or attention is dear, it may be better to focus your attention
on those with beliefs similar to your own (Theorem 1). When it is possible to sample based on
signal value, drawing a signal from a censored distribution can improve inference when there is
heterogeneity in signal quality.
Given this, interventions to limit echo chambers based on the assumption that they are a psy-
chological bias or an irrational misstep may have undesired effects. Simply banning censoring, for
example, reduces the extent to which individuals react to signals that disagree with their priors
(Proposition 2) and hinders inference. Exposing people to contrary views may actually limit their
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willingness to change their own, if they have little reason to trust what they are hearing.
So what interventions can help? Echo chambers are a rational response to uncertainty about
source quality. If high-quality information sources can be identified (perhaps marking the social
media accounts of reporters from trusted news organizations, for example), then this would obviate
the need for filtering based on signal content. Decreasing the proportion of low-quality sources
would improve inference as well, though it does not preclude echo chambers—even if almost all
sources are high quality, it can be preferable to ignore extreme signals if the low-type signal variance
is high enough (Theorem 1). Translating this to a concrete policy could entail greater weighting
of known high-quality accounts in a social media site’s decisions of what posts to show users.
This again requires the ability to distinguish source quality, though if it is simply costly then site
administrators might find it worthwhile to bear the cost to enhance the trustworthiness of their
platform. Another way to change the mix of high- and low-quality sources might be to exploit
differential willingness to pay—perhaps those who have taken the time to craft well thought-out
opinions would be willing to pay a higher cost to share them than others. Finally, improving the
quality of low-type sources can obviate echo chambers, by reducing the incentive to filter them out.
However, this may be the hardest to translate into a concrete policy recommendation.
This paper demonstrates that demand for information can differ depending on its content, not
because of preferences but solely to facilitate inference. An important question not addressed here
is how the supply side reacts to this phenomenon in equilibrium. Since signals closer to one’s prior
expectation can elicit stronger reactions than extreme signals (Proposition 2), those seeking to per-
suade others with distant beliefs may find compromise more effective than accurately stating their
views. However, it is not clear that such shading of signals will survive in equilibrium. Further
exploration of the supply side could also entail extending the binary state space in Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2006) to a richer continuum to explore how consumer beliefs shape the range of opinions
news producers see fit to print.
Another interesting direction might be distributional concerns in a dynamic setting. While cen-
soring can increase the accuracy of beliefs on average, it does make those with inaccurate priors
less likely to encounter high-quality information. If these agents go on to spread their misinformed
beliefs, there may be externalities worth considering for a social planner.
Our paper features a rational agent, unbiased signals, and no conflicts of interest. A more re-
alistic model of political discourse might relax any or all of these, but it will still be reasonable to
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mistrust people with differing views if there is uncertain about information quality. The question
then becomes empirical: how much do observed echo chambers owe to uncertainty about informa-
tion quality? Future empirical work might seek to answer this in various contexts.
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Appendix
A1 Further results for normal sampling
Lemma 9. If h P t0, 1u, γpsq is normal with mean ωγ and variance σ2γ , and the prior belief and signals are
also normally distributed with variances σ0 and σf , then the experiment gps|ω, γq distributes normally with
mean and variance:
µg “ σ
2
γ
σ2f ` σ2γ
ω ` σ
2
f
σ2f ` σ2γ
ωγ and σ2g “
σ2fσ
2
γ
σ2f ` σ2γ
Proof. The product of exponential functions is exponential and gp¨q is guaranteed to be normalized
appropriately to be a distribution function for each value of ω. See Bromiley (2018) for details on
the calculations and the derived formulas.
Note that the uniform distribution is achieved by choosing σ2γ “ 8. Then, ωg “ ω and σ2g “ σ2f .
The agent then chooses the pair pµγ , σ2γq to minimize the expected distance between her action and
the state of the world.
Lemma 10. If h P t0, 1u, γpsq is normal with mean ωγ and variance σ2γ , and the prior belief and signals are
also normally distributed, the optimal sampling has µγ “ µ0, and σ2γ “ 8.
Proof. Given the closed form of the posterior beliefs, we have that ω¯ps, ωγ , σ2γq “ αrλω0 ` p1 ´
λqωγs ` p1 ´ αqs for some policy-dependent coefficients α and λ defined below. Note that the ex-
pected posterior state is a convex combination of the signal and the expected value of the sampling
function gγ . The latter is itself a convex combination of the prior mean, ω0 and the mean of the
policy function ωγ . Therefore, the objective function in Equation (3) has the following closed form:
Lpωγ , σ2γq “ p1´αq2σ2g`rλαω0`p1´λqωγs2`p1´p1´αqλq2rσ20`ω20s´2p1´p1´αqλqω0pλαω0`p1´λqωγq
For any given variance parameter σ2γ P p0,8q the function is maximized at ω‹γ “ ω0, so the
expected loss function simplifies to:
Lpω0, σ2γq “ p1´ αq2σ2g ` p1´ p1´ αqλq2σ20 .
Its unique critical point is σ2˚γ “ σ
2
f´2σ20
σ2f`σ20 which if positive, it is a local maximum. We conclude
24
that no interior solution exists. Finally, we have:
lim
σ2γÑ0
Lpω0, σ2γq “ σ20 and lim
σ2γÑ8
Lpω0, σ2γq “ σ20
˜
σ2f
σ2f ` σ20
¸
ă σ20 .
Therefore the optimal policy in this setup is the uniform sampling γpsq “ 1 for all s P R.
Corollary 3. A normal policy function, γpsq, with finite variance cannot outperform the naive sampling if
the variances of the two types of sources are sufficiently similar.
Proof. When the signal variances are equal, Lemma 10 shows that naive sampling is the optimal
policy. By continuity, if the two variances are similar enough, f will be approximately normal and
naive sampling will still be optimal.
A2 Proofs not in the main text
Proof of Corollary 1. From Lemma 3, the odds of a high-type source are
PpH|s, rq
PpL|s, rq “
h
ş
fHps|ωqµ0pωqdω
p1´ hq ş fLps|ωqµ0pωqdω .
Since both the numerator and the denominator are integrals of two Gaussian probability density
functions, the product is also Gaussian with a well-known closed form. Namely,
ż
fqps|ωqµ0pωqdω “ 1b
2pipσ2q ` σ20q
exp
"
´ ps´ ω0q
2
2pσ2q ` σ20q
*
¨
ż
1a
2piσ21
exp
"
´pω ´ ω1q
2
2σ21
*
dω,
for all q P tH,Lu. Where σ21 and µ1 are constants equal to the standard updated posterior of ω’s
mean and variance after observing s. That is,
σ21 “ 1
σ´2q ` σ´20
, µ1 “ ω0σ
2
1
σ20
` sσ
2
1
σ2q
.
In any case, the integral in the left-hand side is the integral of a normal distribution, so it equals 1.
Therefore,
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ż
fqps|ωqµ0pωqdω “ h
1´ h
a
2pipσ2L ` σ20qa
2pipσ2H ` σ20q
exp
"
´ ps´ ω0q
2
2pσ2H ` σ20q
*
exp
" ps´ ω0q2
2pσ2L ` σ20q
*
Rearranging terms, we obtain the result:
PpH|sq
PpL|sq “
ˆ
h
1´ h
˙d
σ2L ` σ20
σ2H ` σ20
¨ exp
"
´ ps´ ω0q
2pσ2L ´ σ2Hq
2pσ2H ` σ20qpσ2L ` σ20q
*
which is decreasing in ps´ ω0q2, therefore in |s´ ω0|.
Proof of Theorem 1. We will show that if σL is high enough, there exists a feasible strategy involving
censoring which, while not optimal, outperforms in expected utility the best you can do without
censoring.
Since the state ω has a finite variance σ20 , for any  ą 0 there exists r1 such that
σ20 ´
ż
|ω|ďr1
µ0 pωqω2dω ă 
4
(25)
As σ20 “
ş
|ω|ďr1 µ0 pωqω2dω `
ş
|ω|ąr1 µ0 pωqω2dω, this implies
ż
|ω|ąr1
µ0 pωqω2dω ă 
4
(26)
Since
ş
|s|ąr1 fH ps|ωqds ă 1 for any ω,
ż
|ω|ąr1
ż
|s|ąr1
fH ps|ωqµ0 pωqω2dsdω ă 
4
(27)
Now consider the signal s. The probability distribution of s given a high-type source is a mixture
of µ0 pωq and fH ps|ωq. Since both µ0 and fH have finite variance, by the law of total probability s
does as well—denote it σ2sH . Then for any  ą 0 there exists r2 such that
σ2sH ´
ż 8
´8
ż
|s|ăr2
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωq s2dsdω ă 
4
. (28)
So ż 8
´8
ż
|s|ąr2
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωq s2dsdω ă 
4
. (29)
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Since all terms inside the integral are positive, constricting the domain of integration can only
reduce it, and we have ż
|ω|ďr2
ż
|s|ąr2
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωq s2dsdω ă 
4
. (30)
Over the domain of integration ω2 ă s2, so this implies that
ż
|ω|ďr2
ż
|s|ąr2
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqω2dsdω ă 
4
. (31)
Letting r be the maximum of r1 and r2 and summing inequalities 27 and 31, we have that
ż 8
´8
ż
|s|ąr
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqω2dsdω ă 
2
. (32)
Notice that this is equal to the expected loss (negative utility) of simply playing 0 conditional on a
high-type source providing a signal greater than r.6 The expected loss of playing optimally in this
case (given by Equation 4) must be smaller, since playing 0 is feasible. So
ż 8
´8
ż
|s|ąr
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdω ă 2 . (33)
This shows that if r is high enough and there are only high types, the contribution to overall ex-
pected utility from signals outside r becomes vanishingly small. Accordingly, overall expected
utility is almost unchanged if contributions from signals outside r are omitted:
ż 8
´8
ż 8
´8
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdω ´
ż 8
´8
ż
|s|ăr
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdω ă 2 .
(34)
Next we show that censoring to this value of r (and playing a‹H psq, even though it is not optimal)
leaves expected utility nearly unchanged. As noted above the probability distribution of s given a
high type source is a mixture of µ0 pωq and fH ps|ωq. Since this distribution integrates to 1, applying
this to Equation 34 means we can find r high enough such that
ş8
8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqdsdω is close
6Here we are taking advantage of the fact that the utility function happens to take the same form (quadratic) as the second
moment. Were the utility function to take another functional form, we would need that the expected utility of playing zero
be defined.
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enough to 1 that
|
ż 8
´8
ż 8
´8
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdω ´
ş8
´8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdωş8
´8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqdsdω
| ă 
2
.
(35)
Note that the second term on the left hand side is the expected utility of censoring to r and play-
ing a‹H psq (with only high types); we have thus shown that for r high enough it approaches the
expected utility of not censoring (again, with only high types).
By Equation 11, there exists σL such that for any s P p´r, rq, fL ps|ωq is arbitrarily small (recall
that fL ps|ωq achieves its maximum at ω “ s). Then there exists σL large enough that
|
ş8
´8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωq f ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdωş8
´8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωq f ps|ωqdsdω
´
ş8
´8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωqhfH ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdωş8
´8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωqhfH ps|ωqdsdω
| ă 
2
.
(36)
Notice the proportion of high types h cancels out in the second term. The interpretation is that
censoring to r with only high types yields nearly the same expected utility and censoring to r with
both types. This combined with Equation 35 shows demonstrates that there exist r and σL high
enough that
|
ş8
´8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωq f ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdωş8
´8
ş
|s|ďr µ0 pωq f ps|ωqdsdω
´
ż 8
´8
ż 8
´8
µ0 pωq fH ps|ωqu pa‹H psq , ωqdsdω| ă . (37)
The expected utility of censoring to r and playing aH approaches the expected utility of not cen-
soring and playing with high types only. By Lemma 6, this exceeds the expected utility of not
censoring (with both types). Thus there exist r and σL such that censoring to r provides higher
expected utility of not censoring.
Proof of Lemma 8. Starting from prior µ0 with mean ω0, the posterior belief distribution after ob-
serving signal s ą ω0 we will denote as µ1 pω|sq, with expectation
Eµ1 pωq “
ş
ωµ0 pωq f ps|ωq dωş
µ0 pωq f ps|ωq dω . (38)
Since the prior µ0 and signal f are both distributed normally, the posterior distribution µ1 pω|sq
is also normal, and therefore symmetric about its mean Eµ1 pωq. Without loss of generality, let
Eµ1 pωq “ 0. By Lemma 7, this implies that the prior expectation ω0 ă 0. By the symmetry of µ1
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about zero,
ż
ω
µˆ0 pωq
µ0 pωqµ1 pω|sq dω “
ż 8
0
ω
ˆ
µˆ0 pωq
µ0 pωq ´
µˆ0 p´ωq
µ0 p´ωq
˙
µ1 pω|sq dω. (39)
Because ω0 ă 0 and µ0pωqµˆ0pωq is decreasing in |ω ´ ω0|,
µˆ0 pωq
µ0 pωq ´
µˆ0 p´ωq
µ0 p´ωq ą 0. (40)
Combining this with Equation 39, we have
ż
ω
µˆ0 pωq
µ0 pωqµ1 pω|sq dω ą 0, (41)
which implies ş
ωµˆ0 pωq f ps|ωq dωş
µˆ0 pωq f ps|ωq dω ą 0. (42)
The left-hand side is the posterior expectation starting from prior µˆ0, and the right-hand side is (by
assumption) the posterior expectation starting from the sharper prior µ0, so this yields our result:
Eµˆ1 pωq ą Eµ1 pωq . (43)
Analogously, it can be shown in the same way that following a signal less than the prior expectation
Eµˆ1 pωq ă Eµ1 pωq.
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